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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Attributional theories of depression, such as the reformulated helplessness model 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) and the hopelessness model (Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989), are two of the most influential cognitive models of depression, 
impacting both research and intervention efforts. Both are cognitive diathesis-stress 
models, insofar as they suggest that negative life events (NLE) are especially likely to 
generate depression in people who attribute these events to stable and global if not 
internal causes. As interest in childhood depression has increased, researchers have begun 
to test these attributional models in child and adolescent populations (Joiner & Wagner, 
1995). Several researchers have suggested that a certain degree of cognitive maturity is 
necessary before the kinds of depressive attributions described by Abramson et al. are 
even possible (Nolen-Hoeksema, Girgus, & Seligman, 1992; Turner & Cole, 1994). 
Efforts to test this developmental hypothesis have generated somewhat inconsistent 
results (Joiner & Wagner, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992; Turner & Cole, 1994). We 
hypothesize that these inconsistencies exist because this research has used age as a proxy 
for cognitive developmental level. Age is a poor proxy for developmental level (Siegler, 
1996), and a relatively sophisticated level of cognitive development (not simply an 
advanced age) is necessary before youth can truly have the kind of depressive 
attributional style (AS) as described by Abramson et al. (1978, 1989). This study 
examines the degree to which cognitive level (not simply age) serves as a developmental 
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prerequisite for the relevance of attributional style to depression in childhood. Thus my 
hypotheses focus on children’s cognitive capacity to understand and judge the 
internality/externality (I/E), stability/instability (S/I), and globality/specificity (G/S) of 
hypothetical causes as a developmental moderator of the relation between attributional 
style and depressive symptoms.  
We contend that children do not understand key dimensions of causal relation in 
the same way that adults do. Subsequently, we contend that the measures of children’s 
causal attributional style may not tap the same construct as do adult measures. For 
example, a commonly used measure of children’s depressive attributional style is the 
Children’s Attributional Style Questionnaire (CASQ; Seligman, Peterson, Kaslow, 
Tanenbaum, Alloy, & Abramson, 1984). In order to distinguish internal from external 
attributional style, the CASQ asks, “You get very good grades. Is it because (a) School 
work is simple, or (b) You are a hard worker.” This item (and many like it) assumes that 
the child understands ability as an internal and stable attribute. This assumption is 
contradicted by previous research. In previous work (Folmer, et al., 2008; Nicholls, 1978; 
Nicholls & Miller, 1984), young children are shown to conflate ability with effort, such 
that hard work implies high ability across all contexts. In contrast, adolescents and adults 
realize that the person who must work harder to obtain a given outcome must have lower 
ability. Therefore, items such as these will likely mean very different things to older and 
younger respondents.  
This is not an instrument-specific problem; rather it is due to a cognitive level of 
development that does not allow a mature understanding of ability as an internal, stable, 
and trait-like entity (Folmer et al., 2008; Cole et al., 2008). Folmer et al. (2008) replicated 
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and expanded upon Nicholls’ (1978; Nicholls & Miller, 1984) work on children’s 
conception of ability (an internal, stable attribute) and effort (an internal but unstable 
attribute) as causes of achievement-related outcomes. In this previous study, we assessed 
level of cognitive development and motivation to exert effort on tasks with (artificially 
determined) poor outcomes. Results indicated that the exertion of high effort was more 
strongly associated with higher motivation for older participants than for younger 
participants. Task motivation covaried with effort among older participants (who 
understand that failure after exerting high effort implies low ability), but not among 
younger participants (who still conflate ability with effort). This provides support for the 
relevance of cognitive development to motivation, a system that is often disrupted in 
depression. Additionally, age and cognitive level both correlated positively with 
children’s capacity to differentiate ability and effort as causal factors. Collectively, these 
results suggest that attributional theories that rely upon a mature understanding of effort 
and ability (and consequently internality, stability, and globality of causes) may not be 
applicable to younger populations. 
Cole et al. (2008) lend further support to the hypothesis that depressive 
attributional style in childhood is not the same thing as depressive attributional style in 
adolescence. In a three-cohort, four-year longitudinal investigation of over 800 youths 
(grade 2 through 9), they obtained measures of depressive attributional style, negative life 
events and depressive symptoms. Analyses revealed that the consistency of children’s 
attributions across situations was moderately high at all ages. Nevertheless, confirmatory 
factor analysis showed that the cross-sectional structure of AS changed with age, as 
stability became a more salient aspect of AS than internality and globality. Perhaps the 
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most intriguing finding was that the longitudinal structure of AS also changed, becoming 
more time-invariant (i.e., trait-like) as children grew older. That is, structural equation 
modeling revealed that depressive attributional style becomes increasingly style-like as 
children enter into adolescence. Longitudinal analyses further revealed that evidence of a 
cognitive diathesis x stress interaction did not emerge until grades 8 and 9, suggesting 
that AS may not serve as a diathesis for depression at younger ages. In conjunction with 
the results of Folmer et al. (2008), these results lend considerable credence to my 
contention that attributional models of depression may require serious modification 
before they are applied across developmental levels.  
In preparation for the proposed project, we have designed the Peabody Causal 
Attribution Test (PCAT) to assess children’s cognitive developmental level with respect 
to the conception of ability. The PCAT assesses children’s ability to make accurate 
judgments about the causes of hypothetical events. The hypothetical events in the PCAT 
are similar to those used in the major attributional measures for children and adolescents: 
e.g., the Children’s Attributional Style Questionnaire (CASQ; Seligman et al., 1984), the 
Children's Attributional Style Interview (CASI; Conley, Haines, Hilt, & Metalsky, 2001), 
and the Adolescent Cognitive Style Questionnaire (ACSQ; Hankin & Abramson, 2002). 
The PCAT assesses the degree to which children make erroneous judgments about the 
causes of events involving luck (external, unstable, uncontrollable), effort (internal, 
potentially unstable, controllable), and task difficulty (external, stable, uncontrollable). 
Adults should have little trouble answering these questions correctly, given their capacity 
for abstract reasoning and their adult-like conceptualization of trait-like characteristics. 
Children and some adolescents, however, are prone to make anticipatable errors when 
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answering these questions – errors that are consistent with their cognitive level of 
development. A sample PCAT item is, “Jenny does not work very hard in school, but she 
gets very good grades anyway. Sarah works very hard in school. She gets very good 
grades too. Sarah and Jenny both get As all the time. Who is smarter?”  (The item is 
accompanied by an illustration.) Response options are (a) Jenny is smarter, (b) Sarah is 
smarter, and (c) They are the same. Adolescents and adults understand the reciprocal 
relation between effort and ability and would be expected to answer the question 
correctly: Jenny must be smarter because she does not have to work as hard as Sarah. 
Younger children confound effort and ability, suggesting that they would claim that 
Sarah must be smarter because she works harder (and good students work hard). Still 
younger children only focus on the outcome and may proclaim that Jenny and Sarah are 
equally smart because they got the same grades. Containing 24 such items, the PCAT was 
designed to discriminate reliably among children according to the cognitive 
sophistication of their causal attributions.  
This project has three key aims. Our first aim is to validate the PCAT. We 
hypothesize that the PCAT will relate to other cognitive developmental measures and 
age. Second, we anticipate that the PCAT will be related significantly to measures of 
attributional style, suggesting that measures of AS may be confounded by cognitive 
development when applied to child and adolescent populations. Our third aim is to clarify 
the potential moderating effect of cognitive development on the relations among 
attributional style, negative life events, and depression. We hypothesize that when AS is 
measured at early levels of cognitive development (as operationalized by low scores on 
the PCAT), it will not relate to depression in the manner anticipated by attributional 
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models of depression (Abramson et al., 1989). That is, it will not interact with negative 
life events to predict level of depression symptoms. Conversely, we also hypothesize that 
individuals at later levels of cognitive development (operationalized by higher scores on 
the PCAT and supporting measures) do have the cognitive capacity for true depressive 
attributional style, and that measures of AS will interact with NLEs to predict level of 
depressive symptoms. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants  
Participants included 94 male and female participants from grades 3-10 in over 35 
public and private elementary, middle, and high schools in the Nashville area. This age 
range is optimal because (a) depression in youth is rare prior to grade 3, (b) the age range 
includes early adolescence when incidence of depression increases – especially among 
females, (c) the age range spans periods of cognitive development when the capacity for 
abstract reasoning (presumably necessary for understanding the reciprocal relation 
between effort and ability) comes online, and (d) all of the study measures have been 
developed for and/or piloted for use with children throughout this age range.  
 
Table 1 
Demographic characteristics by grade level 
Grade N % Female Mean Age (SD) 
3 16 75%  8.43 (.64) 
4 8 75%  9.38 (.52) 
5 18 39% 10.33 (.48) 
6 11 64% 11.27 (.47) 
7 9 56% 12.67 (.70) 
8 10 40% 13.33 (.70) 
9 16 38% 14.31 (.60) 
10 6 17% 15.33 (.52) 
Total 94 51%   11.62 (2.31) 
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Our sample was racially heterogeneous (45% White, 45% African American, 7% 
Multiple races/ethnicities, 2% Hispanic, 1% Asian). It was also socioeconomically 
diverse, with annual family incomes ranging from less than $10,000 to over $180,000 
(median = $40,000); over 20% of our sample reported an annual income of $10,000.00 or 
less. Participants were screened and excluded based on special needs (such as a 
diagnosed learning disability) or a limited command of English that would interfere with 
their ability to complete the required tasks.
1
  
 
Measures  
Cognitive Development. We administered six measures to assess level of 
cognitive development and obtain an estimated IQ score. The assessment strategy 
involved multiple methods designed to evaluate several areas of cognitive functioning, 
including: 1) the general capacity to understand the reciprocal relation between effort and 
ability (the Nicholls’ Effort-Ability task); 2) verbal short-term and working memory tasks 
(WISC-IV Digit Span Forward and Backward); 3) perceptual organization (WISC-IV 
Picture Concepts); 4) estimated intelligence (comprised of WISC-IV Block design and 
WISC-IV Vocabulary), and 5) the specific capacity to understand what is meant by the 
internality, stability, and globality of causes (the PCAT). As the PCAT is of our own 
construction, we will use the other two measures as part of its validation.  
The Digit Span Task, Picture Concepts, Block Design and Vocabulary tasks were 
taken from the WISC-IV (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fourth Edition; 
Wechsler, 2003). WISC-IV scores show evidence of validity in children 6 to 16 years of 
                                               
1 Our sample included 19 groups of siblings for a total of thirty-nine participants related to another child in 
the study. 
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age and have good internal consistency reliability (.85) and test-retest stability (.83; 
Wechsler, 2003). This sample yielded subscale-specific internal consistency reliabilities 
ranging from .58 (Digit Span Backward) to .93 (Vocabulary). Children’s scores on these 
tasks show age-related differences and typically, WISC-IV scores are scaled according to 
age-appropriate norms. However, we will use the raw scores on the individual subtests to 
compare performance across age groups. We will use the scaled scores to calculate IQ, as 
intelligence is measured relative to same-age peers. These measures are discussed in 
more detail below.  
1. Nicholls’ Effort-Ability Level (EA). Based on Nicholls' (1978; Nicholls & 
Miller, 1984) studies of effort and ability, we developed materials necessary to assess 
children’s level of understanding the reciprocal relation between effort and ability as 
potential causes of achievement outcomes (see Folmer et al., 2008, described above). 
This method is a one-on-one interview focused on a set of questions that follow the 
presentation of a set of video clips. From previous work, we have constructed video clips 
depicting two actors sitting side-by-side at a table. The actors match each other on sex, 
ethnicity, and apparent age. In these video clips, both actors work on a math worksheet. 
One actor works hard on a set of math problems for the entire 2-minute time span, 
exhibiting high effort. The other actor, taking cues from an off-screen research assistant, 
spends approximately half the time fiddling with objects on the desk, hence exhibiting 
low effort. Before and after viewing the video clip, participants are told (a) that one actor 
(e.g., Harry) works hard for the entire time whereas the other actor (e.g., Luke) goofs off 
a lot, and (b) that both of the actors get 2 out of 10 problems correct on the worksheet. 
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All video clips are installed on a Dell Inspiron 1200 laptop computers for presentation to 
participants.  
The follow-up Nicholls’ Effort-Ability questions assess the participants’ 
perceptions of the actors’ relative levels of ability. Two of the questions require fixed 
responses: (1) “Who do you think is smarter?” and (2) “Who do you think is better at 
math?” Response options are “Harry is smarter than Luke,” “Luke is smarter than Harry,” 
and “They are the same.” Still images from these videos serve as photographs for 
participants to use as references while answering questions. The next 3 questions are in a 
free-response format: (3) "How come both of them got the same score when one worked 
hard and the other didn't work hard?” (4) “What would happen if both of them worked 
really hard? Would one of them do better than the other, or would they do the same as 
each other?” and (5) “How can you tell?"  Finally, the first two questions are re-
administered as a reliability probe. All responses are videotaped for later scoring using 
Nicholls’ (1978; Nicholls & Miller, 1984) criteria.  
Two independent raters scored the free-response questions using a scoring rubric 
based upon Nicholls’ descriptions of the four effort-ability differentiation levels (Nicholls 
& Miller, 1984). Because these questions build upon one another, the raters considered 
them jointly when making their judgments. Responses were transcribed and raters were 
naïve to the participants’ ages, sex, and grade levels during the rating process. Each 
participant’s effort-ability question set was scored from 1 to 4 to yield a Nicholls’ Effort-
Ability Level, with 4 indicating the most mature understanding and 1 indicating the least. 
Inter-rater reliability in this study was good (r = .85) and resembled that of previous 
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studies (r = .87; Folmer et al., 2008). Disagreements were resolved by inter-rater 
conferences.  
2. Digit Span Task (DS). The Digit Span Task (as taken from the WISC-IV; 
Wechsler, 2003) asks respondents to remember and repeat a series of numbers that 
systematically increases in length. For the first task, respondents are asked to repeat the 
numbers exactly as heard (Digit Span Forward). For the next task, they are asked to 
repeat the numbers in reverse order (Digit Span Backward). Each task has 16 trials that 
form 8 items. Other studies (Alloway, Gathercole, & Pickering, 2006) have demonstrated 
that Digit Span Forward comprises a measure of verbal short-term memory and Digit 
Span Backward measures verbal working memory. Both verbal short-term and working 
memory capacities should play important roles in children’s ability to understand 
hypothetical scenarios, consider multiple causes/outcomes/alternatives, and draw a 
conclusion. Working memory skills have also been linked to false-belief understanding, a 
developmentally-linked theory of mind task, in young children (Mutter, Alcorn, & 
Welsh, 2006). Therefore, given the age-related differences in Digit Span performance, its 
approximation of verbal short-term and working memory, and the relevance of such 
memory to the ability to consider simultaneously multiple hypothetical causes and 
scenarios, the Digit Span Task is an appropriate validation tool for the PCAT. 
3. Picture Concepts (PC). Picture Concepts (as taken from the WISC-IV; 
Wechsler, 2003) asks respondents to look at several rows of pictures and pick one picture 
from each row that best fits with the other pictures selected. It assesses a child’s ability to 
use abstract and perceptual reasoning skills to group items together (Sattler & Dumont, 
2004). We used PC raw scores to examine how children’s ability to discern sometimes 
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subtle relationships may relate to their understanding of the reciprocal relations between 
effort/task difficulty/luck and ability.  
4. Estimated IQ Score. We estimated IQ by summing Block Design and 
Vocabulary scaled scores (see descriptions below) and using this sum to obtain IQ 
estimates from Sattler and Dumont’s (2004) tables. This method, based on work by Cyr 
and Brooker’s (1984) work, has shown good reliability (rxx = .92) and validity (r = .87) 
and has been used successfully in other studies as a brief IQ screener (Biederman, Carter, 
Ball, Fried, Doyle, Cohen, et al., 2009; Campbell, 1998; Seidman, Buka, Goldstein, & 
Tsuang, 2006). This IQ score provided us with an estimate of each participant’s cognitive 
functioning relative to other children at the same age level. We included an estimate of 
IQ to distinguish between overall cognitive skill level, which we expect to remain 
relatively stable at all age levels (Hoekstra, Bartels, & Boomsma, 2007; Juan-Espinosa, 
Garcia, Colom, & Abad, 2000; Mortensen, Andresen, Kruuse, Sanders, & Reinisch, 
2003) and the emergence of more developmentally-linked factors such as Nicholls’ 
Effort-Ability Level.  
Vocabulary (VC). Vocabulary (as taken from the WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2003) asks 
respondents to name pictured objects (Items 1-4) and define words presented visually and 
verbally (Items 5-36). It assesses language development, verbal comprehension, and 
verbal skills (Sattler & Dumont, 2004).  
Block Design (BD). Block Design (as taken from the WISC-IV; Wechsler, 2003) 
is a timed subtest that asks respondents to reproduce printed designs using 2, 4, or 9 
blocks within a given time limit. Block Design consists of 14 items and includes a time 
bonus when designs are completed within certain time intervals. It is thought to assess 
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nonverbal reasoning ability, visual-motor integration, and the ability to synthesize visual 
information (Sattler & Dumont, 2004), which may relate to a child’s ability to respond to 
illustrated questionnaires.  
5. Peabody Causal Attribution Test (PCAT). The PCAT assesses children’s 
cognitive capacity to understand key features of causal attributions, especially those 
features used to define a depressive attributional style (i.e., internality/externality, 
stability/instability, globality/specificity). The PCAT accomplishes this with a series of 
questions that children will only get “right” if they understand the relation between 
ability and effort, ability and luck, and ability and task difficulty. This instrument consists 
of 24 items describing hypothetical, developmentally appropriate scenarios. Each item is 
illustrated. These items can be broken down into three separate 8-item subscales: Effort, 
Task Difficulty, and Luck. The PCAT was administered individually (one-on-one) at all 
grade levels to avoid confounding method with developmental level.  
Depressive Symptoms. We obtained measures of depressive symptoms in 
participants by asking participants about themselves and parents about the participants. 
Trained research assistants verbally administered child questionnaires in a private, one-
on-one setting. Participants were instructed to read along and mark their own answers.  
 Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI). The CDI (Kovacs, 1985) is a 27-item 
self-report measure that assesses cognitive, affective, and behavioral symptoms of 
depression in children. Each item consists of three statements graded in order of 
increasing severity from 0 to 2. Children select one sentence from each group that best 
describes themselves for the past two weeks (e.g., “I am sad once in a while,” “I am sad 
many times,” or “I am sad all the time”). In nonclinic populations, the CDI has relatively 
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high levels of internal consistency, test-retest reliability, predictive, convergent, 
discriminant, and construct validity, and has been validated for use with children as 
young as 3
rd
 grade (Cole & Jordan, 1995; Craighead, Smucker, Craighead & Ilardi, 1998; 
Smucker, Craighead, Craighead & Green, 1986; Timbremont, Braet, & Dreessen, 2004). 
In this sample, scores on the CDI showed good internal consistency reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .83).   
 Life Events and Attributional Style. The following measures of negative life 
events and depressive attributional style have been validated for use with children at least 
as young as 8 years old. 
 1. Perceived Events Schedule (PES). The PES (Compas, Davis, Forsythe, & 
Wagner, 1987) consists of 89 items that assess both daily (“Not spending enough time 
with friends”) and major (“Death of a family member”) life events. Respondents identify 
each event that has happened in the preceding four months. They then rate the desirability 
of each event on a 9-point Likert scale, with 1 being “extremely bad” and 9 being 
“extremely good.” A ruler illustrating the 1-9 scale provides visual support for 
respondents and separate instructions are provided for children under the age of 10. 
Desirability ratings are then converted to a -4 to 4 valence score scale, with lower scores 
indicating more negativity. All positively rated events are summed to form an overall 
Positive Event valence total and all negatively rated events are summed to form a 
Negative Event valence total. For the purposes of this study, we examined only the 
Negative Event valence total. Scores on this measure have been shown to have good test-
retest reliability (rs ranging from .77-.89) in adolescents (Compas et al., 1987). The PES 
was completed by participants about themselves and by parents about the participants. 
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Due to discrepancies between parent- and child-reported events, we created a composite 
Negative Life Event (NLE) variable. If only a child or parent reported a negative event, 
we used that single valence score. However, if both parents and children reported the 
event, we took the average valence rating.  
2. Attributional Style. We assessed participants’ AS using one of two measures, 
depending upon participant age. For younger children (grades 3-6), we used the 
Children’s Attributional Style Interview (CASI; Conley et al., 2001). Each of the 16 
items (8 positive, 8 negative) presents a hypothetical situation and accompanying picture. 
Children are asked to imagine themselves in the situation and provide the one main 
reason that the situation happened to them. Children then rate their causal attribution on 
three 7-point scales:  internality (how much their causal reason was “because of you”), 
stability (if their reason “would be true again?”), and globality (if their reason would 
“make other bad things happen?”). A validation study of this measure in a group of 
children (age range 5-10) revealed good subscale internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas 
range from .72-.82; Conley et al., 2001). In this sample, alphas ranged from .51 (internal 
subscale) to .80 (global subscale).  
For older children and adolescents (grades 6-10), we used the Adolescent 
Cognitive Style Questionnaire (ACSQ; Hankin & Abramson, 2002). The ACSQ presents 
respondents with 12 negative hypothetical events (six interpersonal, six achievement). 
Respondents think of one reason why the event may have happened. They then rate the 
internality, stability, and globality of the cause, as well as negative inferences about 
consequences and implications for the self, along a 7-point Likert scale, with higher 
scores indicating a more depressotypic response. Past studies have shown that we can 
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obtain high reliability in the use of this measure (alphas range from .74-.88, Cole et al., 
2008; see also Hankin & Abramson, 2002). This sample yielded alphas of .70 for 
internality, .82 for stability, and .78 for globality.  
Previous work from our lab on a sample of 120 7
th
 graders revealed that the CASI 
and ACSQ are congenerically equivalent (Cole et al., 2008). More specifically, multitrait-
multimethod confirmatory factor analysis revealed that comparable CASI and ACSQ 
subscales tap the same three underlying constructs: internality/externality, 
stability/instability, globality/specificity. Factor loadings were large and significant for all 
subscales. Means and standard deviations for the two measures are also quite comparable. 
Because of these measures’ congeneric equivalence, we created a composite Attributional 
Style variable (AS) by summing the total scores for each CASI and ACSQ subscale 
(Internality, Stability, Globality) and creating total scores for both measures. We then 
standardized the scores due to the differing lengths of the measures. For participants who 
completed either the CASI or the ACSQ (n = 82), we used the single standardized score 
from the administered instrument. However, for participants who completed both (n = 
11), we took the mean of the two scores and used that averaged value. We used this 
composite AS variable in our analyses. 
Demographic Information. We administered a brief questionnaire to parents to 
gather demographic information. This information included the child’s age, grade, and 
school, parents’ marital status, ages, and educational achievements, relation of the 
respondent to the participant, family size (including number of children and adults 
currently living in the home), and annual income.  
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Procedure 
Doctoral psychology students and advanced undergraduates were extensively 
trained on all measures prior to data collection. Data collection took place in our 
laboratory on the Vanderbilt campus. Sessions were scheduled with the participant's 
parents. We provided vouchers for taxi cabs to transport participants to and from our 
laboratory, if necessary. This ensured that lack of available transportation did not prohibit 
participation. Of 94 participants, 10 required assistance with transportation.  
We administered the following measures to participants in a single session: 
1. Cognitive development: To assess level of developmentally-linked 
cognitive abilities, we administered the Nicholls’ Task, Digit Span, Block 
Design, Picture Concepts, Vocabulary, and the PCAT.  
2. Depressive symptoms: To assess symptoms of depression, we 
administered the CDI to participants. 
3. Attributional style: To assess this cognitive diathesis for depression, we 
administered either the CASI or the ACSQ (depending on the child’s age).  
4. Life stress: To measure life stress over the preceding four months, we 
administered the PES to participants about themselves and to parents 
about participants. 
5. Demographic Information. To obtain information on demographic 
characteristics, we administered a brief questionnaire to parents.  
We administered measures to participants in two different orders to reduce the effect of 
fatigue or sequence on any particular instrument. In both sequences, the PCAT and CDI 
were administered first to reduce the likelihood of previous measures (such as 
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attributional style questionnaires or the Nicholls Effort-Ability task) influencing reported 
depression levels or effort-ability understanding. We then alternated the administration 
order of the measures of cognitive development, attributional questionnaires, and PES. 
Finally, we concluded each time with the Nicholls’ task. The entire session took 
approximately 90 minutes. Participants and their parents were offered a snack break 
approximately 45 minutes into the session. After completing the measures, participants 
received $50 compensation as well as a candy bar. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics. Descriptive statistics for key study variables are presented 
in Table 2.  CASI and ACSQ means and standard deviations are similar to scores 
reported in other samples (Conley et al., 2001; Hankin & Abramson, 2002; LaGrange et 
al., 2008). CDI scores are generally consistent with previous work (Cole, Hoffman, Tram, 
& Maxwell, 2000; Tram & Cole, 2006), aside from slight elevations (+.5 sd) at ages 8-, 
13-, and 14-years. We found similar elevations in another sample of youth at risk for 
depression from this community (Cole et al., 2008). These results are consistent with 
research on other lower socioeconomic status, community samples of youth that show 
elevated CDI scores (e.g., Edelsohn, Ialongo, Werthamer-Larsson, Crockett, & Kallam, 
1992; Fitzpatrick, 1993). In the current project, 7 participants (7.5%) obtained CDI scores 
of 19 or above. 
PCAT Psychometrics. We scored the PCAT using a dichotomous system in which 
a 1 represents the most adult-like answer (e.g., “We don’t know why he won the game of 
dice; it was because of luck”) and a 0 represents the two less adult-like answers (e.g., “He 
won the game of dice because he worked hard;” “[Loser] is better at the game, he just let 
[Winner] win”). We created a total score to examine overall PCAT understanding as well 
as three subscale scores that encompassed the three question types: Effort, Task 
Difficulty, and Luck. We next examined the PCAT factor structure. To conduct a factor 
analysis on dichotomous data, we created a smoothed tetrachoric correlation matrix using 
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Table 2 
Means and standard deviations of key measures by age  
 
8 (N = 8) 9 (N = 12) 10 (N = 16) 11 (N = 14) 12 (N = 8) 13 (N = 8) 14 (N = 16) 15 (N = 9) 16 (N = 3) 
CDI  11.00 (6.72) 7.42 (7.49)  6.69 (5.77)  8.07 (6.04)  6.38 (3.02)   2.63 (2.92)  9.00 (5.53)  9.78 (6.38)  6.00 (5.57) 
NLE  -29.00 (15.89) -23.17 (19.58)  -21.00 (13.13)  -28.29 (17.70)  -25.00 (18.52)  -14.75 (9.57)  -24.06 (14.81)  -32.11 (18.60)  -35.83 (15.97) 
CASI  90.63 (28.85) 87.50 (23.57) 87.44 (18.62)  92.92 (16.92) 109.67 (19.04) -- -- -- -- 
ACSQ -- -- -- 137.75 (16.02) 117.24 (23.46) 135.88 (25.90) 143.50 (29.40) 139.00 (31.10) 137.33 (48.01) 
VC  28.75 (7.36) 30.92 (11.21) 37.31 (11.93)   36.57 (9.76) 40.25 (7.72) 43.00 (11.49)  42.50 (14.90) 45.67 (11.46) 34.00 (14.53) 
BD  27.63 (14.66) 24.75 (11.56) 35.88 (13.79)  35.71 (14.69) 36.13 (15.70) 30.38 (13.50)  38.25 (15.94) 46.67 (7.26) 31.00 (4.35) 
DS  15.75 (2.66) 13.67 (4.72) 16.75 (3.75)  15.64 (2.44) 14.00 (3.02) 16.75 (3.12)  16.94 (2.95) 18.22 (3.38) 14.00 (1.00) 
PC  16.50 (3.21) 16.91 (3.58) 18.81 (4.32)  17.43 (2.90) 16.63 (3.81) 18.63 (4.47)  18.69 (4.51) 17.11 (4.37) 19.00 (4.36) 
IQ 103.25 (18.63) 98.58 (21.59) 106.69 (19.72) 100.36 (19.87) 99.25 (17.75) 93.50 (19.00)  95.44 (22.30) 99.22 (14.25) 74.67 (13.01) 
PCATT  13.88 (6.10) 14.50 (5.82) 14.44 (5.62)  15.50 (5.50) 14.63 (5.01) 17.25 (5.78)  17.56 (4.15) 17.11 (5.35) 14.33 (9.87) 
PCATE  2.25 (3.28) 3.67 (2.57) 2.43 (2.53)  2.43 (2.59) 1.75 (2.38) 3.50 (3.70)  3.69 (2.68) 3.56 (2.96) 4.67 (4.16) 
PCATD   6.50 (2.27) 6.25 (1.96) 5.44 (2.76)  6.79 (1.37) 5.87 (2.64) 6.38 (2.45)  6.50 (2.25) 6.33 (1.80) 5.33 (2.08) 
PCATL  5.13 (2.69) 4.58 (2.75) 6.56 (2.44)  6.29 (3.12) 7.00 (2.07) 7.38 (.92)  7.38 (1.54) 7.22 (1.30) 4.33 (3.79) 
EA  1.75 (1.16) 1.75 (1.14) 1.94 (1.06)  2.21 (1.19) 2.75 (1.04) 2.88 (1.25)  2.94 (.85) 3.00 (1.31) 2.33 (1.53) 
Note. CDI = Children’s Depression Inventory; NLE = Composite Negative Life Events Valence Score (Lower score = More stress reported); CASI = 
Children’s Attributional Style Interview; ACSQ = Adolescent Cognitive Style Questionnaire; VC = Vocabulary Comprehension, unstandardized raw 
score; BD = Block Design, unstandardized raw score; DS = Digit Span, unstandardized raw score; PC = Picture concepts, unstandardized raw score; IQ 
= Intelligence Quotient, estimated using Block Design and Vocabulary Comprehension; PCATT = Peabody Causal Attribution Test, Total score; 
PCATE = Peabody Causal Attribution Test, Effort subscale; PCATD = Peabody Causal Attribution Test, Task Difficulty subscale; PCATL = Peabody 
Causal Attribution Test, Luck subscale; EA = Nicholls’ Effort Ability level.
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the TetCorr correlation program (Fleming, J. S., 2005). Previous work (Knol & ten 
Berge, 1989; Uebersax, 2006) has demonstrated that “smoothing,” or removing negative 
eigenvalues, should be performed before conducting a factor analysis on a tetrachoric 
correlation matrix. We conducted three separate principle axis factor analyses. As seen in 
Table 3, each analysis yielded a single factor that accounted for most of the variance 
within each PCAT subscale.  
 
Table 3 
Factor structure of the PCAT  
 Effort Task Difficulty Luck 
Eigenvalue 1 5.74 6.39 6.99 
Eigenvalue 2 .93 .42 .29 
Eigenvalue 3 .36 .32 .27 
Eigenvalue 4 .34 .26 .15 
Eigenvalue 5 .25 .21 .11 
Eigenvalue 6 .20 .19 .09 
Eigenvalue 7 .11 .13 .06 
Eigenvalue 8 .07 .09 .03 
 
 
Primary factor loadings ranged from .78 to .98 with the exception of one item, which 
loaded only .41 (see Table 4). This item asks a question about popularity, which may 
explain why it did not load as strongly as others onto the Effort subscale. Overall, PCAT 
items loaded very well onto their a priori subscale factors. Each of the subscales showed 
good reliability (see Table 4) with alphas ranging from .81 to .90. Discriminant validity 
was also good, with no subscale correlating with another more than .40 (see Table 5). 
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Table 4 
PCAT item loadings 
 Effort Task Difficulty Luck 
 Item #22 .92 Item #18 .95 Item #11 .98 
 Item #16 .92 Item #6 .92 Item #5 .96 
 Item #10 .88 Item #24 .90 Item #8 .94 
 Item #13 .87 Item #12 .88 Item #17 .93 
 Item #7 .86 Item #9 .87 Item #20 .92 
 Item #4 .85 Item #21 .87 Item #2 .91 
 Item #1 .81 Item #3 .84 Item #14 .90 
 Item #19 .41 Item #15 .79 Item #23 .87 
Cronbach’s α .87 .81 .90 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
PCAT Discriminant Evidence Coefficients 
 Effort Task Difficulty Luck 
Effort 
 1.00        .40
**
  .22
*
 
Task Difficulty    .40
**
       1.00  .31
**
 
Luck    .22
*
        .31
**
 1.00 
*
 p < .05. 
**
 p < .01.  
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Because we conducted three separate factor analyses and were unable to examine cross-
loadings, we investigated the possibility that the subscales significantly overlapped to the 
point of redundancy. If the true subscale correlation was 1.0, then the maximum observed 
correlation after attenuation due to measurement error would equal the product of the 
square root of the reliabilities, or approximately .85. Observed subscale correlations were 
.22, .31, and .40 – all substantially less than .85, providing evidence of discriminant 
validity.  
Aim 1: PCAT scores, age, and cognitive-developmental variables. To examine the 
relation of the PCAT to other variables, we conducted a series of bivariate correlational 
analyses (see Table 6). We discovered that although overall PCAT performance (PCAT-
Total) did not correlate with Age (r = .20, p = ns), it showed moderately strong relations 
with other measures of cognitive development. PCAT-Total showed a positive relation to 
IQ, with higher PCAT scores indicating higher IQ scores (r = .52, p < .01). Because IQ is 
corrected for age, we also examined the relation of PCAT-Total to raw scores on WISC-
IV subtests. We found significant positive correlations with Block Design (.44, p < .01) 
and Vocabulary (.61, p < .01), used for estimating IQ, as well as Picture Concepts (r = 
.35, p< .01) and Digit Span (r = .33, p < .01). Although the PCAT was not related to 
chronological age, it was significantly correlated with cognitive skills (such as working 
memory and abstract reasoning). Additional support for this hypothesis emerged from 
examinations of PCAT-Total and EA, which showed a moderate positive correlation (r = 
.45, p < .01). This provides evidence of convergent validity for the PCAT by 
demonstrating that it correlates in the anticipated direction with a previously established 
measure of the understanding of attributional dimensions. 
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Table 6 
Correlations between key measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p < .05. ** p < .01.  
Note. Age = Child’s age; CDI = Children’s Depression Inventory; AS = Attributional Style Composite; VC = Vocabulary Comprehension, 
unstandardized raw score; BD = Block Design, unstandardized raw score; DS = Digit Span, unstandardized raw score; PC = Picture concepts, 
unstandardized raw score; IQ = Intelligence Quotient, estimated using Block Design and Vocabulary Comprehension; PCATT = Peabody Causal 
Attribution Test, Total score; PCATE = Peabody Causal Attribution Test, Effort subscale; PCATD = Peabody Causal Attribution Test, Task Difficulty 
subscale; PCATL = Peabody Causal Attribution Test, Luck subscale; EA =Nicholls’ Effort Ability level; NLE = Composite Negative Life Events 
Valence Score (Lower score = More stress reported).
 AGE CDI AS IQ PC DS BD VC PCATT PCATE PCATD PCATL EA NLE 
AGE    1.00              
CDI    -.00    1.00             
AS     .10      .32**    1.00            
IQ    -.18     -.13      .29**    1.00           
PC      .08     -.05      .35**      .41**    1.00          
DS      .19     -.14      .21*      .38**      .32**    1.00         
BD      .29**     -.09      .18      .76**      .33**      .37**   1.00        
VC      .37**     -.11      .40**      .74**      .47**      .45**     .61**   1.00       
PCATT      .20     -.07      .39**      .52**      .35**      .33**     .44**     .61**      1.00      
PCATE      .13     -.01      .23*      .26*      .13      .18     .27**     .28**        .77**     1.00     
PCATD      .04      .05      .28*      .39**      .35**      .14     .27**     .41**        .74**       .40**      1.00    
PCATL      .26*     -.18      .35**      .52**      .32**      .42**     .43**     .68**        .69**       .22*        .31**     1.00   
EA      .39**      .04      .35**      .31**      .24*      .30**     .41**     .49**        .45**       .38**        .24*       .35**   1.00  
NLE     -.08     -.53**     -.19      .16      .19      .11     .06     .11        .16       .14        .04       .16     .11   1.00 
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After examining the relation between PCAT-Total and other cognitive variables, 
we next looked at the PCAT subscales of Effort, Task Difficulty, and Luck. We 
discovered similar patterns of subscales correlating with other cognitive developmental 
variables. With regard to Age, Luck showed a modest, significant, positive correlation (r 
= .26, p < .05), indicating that older children were slightly more likely to answer a Luck 
item correctly. None of the other subscales showed a consistent relation with Age. Effort 
showed a modest correlation with IQ (r = .26, p < .05) whereas Task Difficulty (r = .39, p 
< .01) and Luck (r = .52, p < .01) showed stronger relations. This suggests that the 
positive relation between IQ and overall PCAT score is not due to one particular subscale 
bur rather to performance on all three. All three subscales also showed significant 
positive correlations with raw scores on Block Design (rs = .27-.43, ps < .05) and 
Vocabulary (rs = .28-.68, ps < .05). However, when examining relations with Picture 
Concepts and Digit Span, differences between subscales emerged. Task Difficulty (r = 
.35, p < .01) and Luck (r = .23, p < .01) showed significant relations with Picture 
Concepts, but Effort (r = .13, p < ns) did not. Digit Span showed more marked 
differences, correlating only with Luck (r = .42, p < .01). Finally, all three subscales also 
showed positive, significant relations with Nicholls’ Effort-Ability Level, suggesting that 
better effort/ability differentiation skills are associated with an understanding of the 
luck/ability and task difficulty/ability differentiation as well. Overall, PCAT subscales 
behaved much in the same way as PCAT-Total, with higher PCAT subscale scores 
correlating with better participant performance on cognitive developmental measures.  
Aim 2: PCAT Scores and Attributional Style. Because we hypothesized that high 
PCAT scores would relate to children’s (internal, stable, global) attributional style, we 
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next examined the relations between the PCAT and AS. As seen in Table 6, higher 
PCAT-Total scores were associated with higher AS scores (r = .39, p < .01). Similarly, 
higher scores on the Effort (r = .23, p < .05), Task Difficulty (r = .28, p < .05), and Luck 
(r = .35, p < .01) subscales also related significantly to the endorsement of internal, 
stable, and global attributions. Children who endorsed a more sophisticated causal 
attribution understanding responded to attributional style questionnaires in a more adult-
like, depressotypic fashion.  
Aim 3: Moderation Analyses. We hypothesized that the relation between 
attributional style, negative life event valence scores, and depression will be different at 
early levels of cognitive development (as operationalized by PCAT-Total scores) than 
later levels. To test this hypothesis, we conducted multiple regression analyses using 
NLE, AS, PCAT-Total, and their interactions to predict depression as measured by the 
CDI. As seen in Table 7, the NLE x AS x PCAT interaction significantly predicted 
depression scores (β = .22, p < .05), and the addition of the three-way interaction to the 
regression explained a significant portion of the variance beyond the two-way 
interactions and main effects (R
2
 = .03, p < .05). This is equivalent to a small effect size 
according to Cohen’s (1988) standards for testing a three-way interaction. We next 
plotted the interaction to examine its direction. As seen in Figure 1, AS x NLE related to 
higher depression scores for children with low (-1 sd below the mean) but not high (+1 sd 
above the mean) PCAT scores.  
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Table 7 
PCAT-Total, Attributional Style, and Negative Life Events predicting CDI Score 
 Predictor B SE(B) β ∆ R2 
Step 1 NLE -2.71 .54 -.46
***
  
 AS 1.66 .57  .28
**
  
 PCAT -.64 .67 -.11 .34
***
 
Step 2 NLE -2.58 .55 -.44
***
  
 AS 1.75 .57  .30
**
  
 PCAT -.97 .59 -.16  
 NLExAS -1.18 .60 -.19  
 NLExPCAT .71 .58  .12  
 PCATxAS -.70 .57 -.11 .05 
Step 3 NLE -3.02 .58 -.51
***
  
 AS 1.52 .57  .26
**
  
 PCAT -.84 .58 -.14  
 NLExAS -.78 .61 -.13  
 NLExPCAT .99 .59 -.17  
 PCATxAS -.62 .56 -.10  
 NLExPCATxAS 1.12 .52  .22
*
 .03
*
 
*p <.05 **p <.01 ***p < .001.  
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High PCAT Score 
 
 
                           
 
 
 
 
Low PCAT Score 
 
 
                          
 
 
Figure 1.  CDI scores as a function of Attributional Style and Negative Life Event 
Valence Score: High PCAT vs. Low PCAT scores 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Four major findings emerged from this study. We first demonstrated that our new 
measure, the PCAT, has a solid factor structure that corresponds with its a priori design. 
Second, like Nicholls (1984), we found that children’s capacity to understand causal 
attributional dimensions is tied to cognitive level of development. Third, we discovered 
that measures of attributional style are related to (or cofounded with) cognitive level of 
development. Finally, we found evidence of a diathesis-stress interaction between 
attributional style and negative life events to predict depression for children with low, but 
not high, PCAT scores. We elaborate on these findings and discuss their implications 
below.   
Our first finding was that the PCAT appears to be a psychometrically sound 
measure of children’s understanding of causal outcomes related to effort, task difficulty, 
luck, and ability. Scores on the PCAT demonstrated good internal consistency and factor 
analyses revealed evidence of construct validity; the PCAT yielded three moderately 
correlated factors that fit our a priori determinations of subscale content. The first factor, 
Effort, consists of questions that assessed children’s correct understanding of effort as a 
causal parameter. Children with low scores on Effort fail to understand that working 
harder than another person to achieve the same outcome implies something negative 
about one’s ability, when one’s effort is controlled. The second factor, Task Difficulty, 
consists of questions that vary the difficulty of a task while holding outcome constant. 
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Children with low Task Difficulty scores fail to recognize that the difficulty of a task, not 
just the outcome, has implications for a person’s ability. The third and final factor, Luck, 
presents situations in which the outcome is determined by chance. Children with low 
Luck scores erroneously attribute greater ability to the person with the positive outcome 
instead of understanding that outcome is not necessarily related to ability or effort. The 
importance of these three measurable factors – Effort, Task Difficulty, and Luck – 
becomes clear when one considers the dimensions of attributional style. Effort, task 
difficulty, and luck are distinguished by the degree to which they imply something about 
the internality, globality, stability, and controllability of the cause of events. The 
observed developmental differences on the PCAT would seem to reflect cognitive 
differences in children’s fundamental understanding of causation and causal attribution 
dimensions. 
Our second finding derived from our examination of convergent validity between 
the PCAT and cognitive measures of cognitive development. Nicholls and others (1984; 
Nicholls & Miller, 1985, 1984) demonstrated that children conceive of luck, task 
difficulty, and effort in characteristic ways that change with age. We replicated these 
findings with our measure of Effort-Ability, which in this study and previous work 
(Folmer et al., 2008) showed significant positive correlations with age. However, this 
project goes one step further by describing some of the mechanisms responsible for 
developmental changes in a child’s capacity for attributional understanding. Cognitive 
abilities such as working memory, intelligence, and abstract reasoning relate to children’s 
ability to judge the causes of situations and may explain part of the age-related changes 
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seen. The PCAT provides evidence that children’s understanding of ability, effort, and 
luck as causal factors is tied to level of cognitive development.  
 Our third finding was that PCAT scores showed significant, positive relations 
with measures of attributional style. If younger children do not understand major causal 
parameters like effort, task difficulty, and luck (or the underlying dimensions of 
internality, stability, globality, and controllability), they may respond to attributional style 
measures in ways that are difficult to interpret. If children conflate ability and effort by 
indicating on the PCAT that hard workers are more talented, what does it mean when 
they say, “I failed the test because I am stupid?” What attributional style questionnaires 
assess would seem to vary with the respondent’s level of cognitive development. Other 
authors have documented a variety of problems with measures of attributional style. 
When administered to children, attributional questionnaires have demonstrated low 
internal consistency (Conley et al., 2001; Thompson, Kaslow, Weiss, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998), predictive validity (Bell, McCallum, & Doucette, 2004; Conley et al., 
2001; Reijntjes, Dekovic, Vermande, & Telch, 2007), and stability (Cole et al., 2008). 
These inconsistencies suggest that something is amiss with how we measure attributional 
style, if not with the very concept of attributional style in younger groups. The downward 
extension of adult theories of psychopathology to children has yielded inconsistent results 
in the past (Joiner & Wagner, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992; Turner & Cole, 1994). 
Our results lend further support to what previous studies have suggested (Cole et al, 
2008; Nicholls & Miller, 1985; Rholes, Blackwell, Jordan, & Walters, 1980), that 
children’s understanding of causal parameters may differ fundamentally from adults’.   
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 Our fourth finding was that attributional style and negative life events interacted 
to predict depression in children with low, but not high, PCAT scores. Although contrary 
to our initial hypothesis, this finding makes intuitive sense upon reflection. Multiple 
studies (Gale, Hatch, Batty, & Deary, 1989; Koenen et al., 2009; Leech, Larkby, Day, & 
Day, 2005; Weisz, 1979) have found that lower intellectual abilities place a child at risk 
for helplessness and depression in adolescence and adulthood. Perhaps an immature 
understanding of causal relations leaves children vulnerable to depression, especially 
when they have a negative attributional style. If children who attribute negative events to 
something internal, stable and global also lack the cognitive capacity to consider 
alternative attributions (such as task difficulty or luck), they may be especially likely to 
experience an increase in depressive symptoms. The mixed evidence for the attributional 
style x negative life events interaction in children (Abela, 2001; Cole et al., 2008; Joiner 
& Wagner, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992; Turner & Cole, 1994) suggests that 
developmental shifts occur in the strength of the relation between children’s self-reported 
depression and attributions for negative events. Perhaps the cognitive-developmental 
factors assessed by the PCAT should be considered in future studies of the relations 
between attributional style, life stress, and depression in young children.  
 Several shortcomings of the current study suggest avenues for future 
investigation. First, the project was cross-sectional in nature, which limited our ability to 
explore longitudinal relations between variables. Perhaps assessing depression at two 
time points and negative life events over the interim may have strengthened our test of 
the diathesis-stress interaction. Second, although we found many significant results 
despite our modest sample size, a larger sample across a greater age range may have 
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allowed us to test more effectively for age effects. Finally, this sample was drawn from 
the community and did not compare high-risk to low-risk populations. Repeating this 
project with a sample with greater diagnostic-risk diversity could strengthen our ability to 
test our hypotheses related to depression and will be an important next step.  
 In spite of these limitations, we succeeded in measuring a very specific set of 
cognitive developmental skills. Our findings suggest that children’s cognitive 
developmental level of understanding effort, task difficulty, luck, and ability is clearly 
linked to performance on measures of attributional style, if not attributional style itself. 
What children mean when they make an attribution may be qualitatively different from 
what adults mean; this calls into question just what, exactly, we are measuring when we 
administer attributional questionnaires to young samples. The PCAT takes us closer to 
answering this question by providing a window into the cognitive developmental 
differences that may account for inconsistencies in the literature.  
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